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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this case
pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-2a-3 (2). (e) .
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Should

the

Court

uphold

the

uncounseled

conviction

Appellant when the trial court imposed no actual or

of

suspended

sentence of incarceration, but instead demanded of him only time
served, which time would have been required of him no matter what
sentence the trial court mandated?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Constitutional issues . . . are questions of law that [the
Court] review[s] for correctness." Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177,
1185 (Utah 2004); see also State v. Bvinqton, 936 P.2d 1112, 1115
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) .
"Application of statutory law to the facts presents a mixed
question of fact and law. [The Court] review [s] the [trial] court's
findings for clear error and its conclusions of law for correctness
. . . ." In re G.B., 53 P.3d 963, 966 (Utah Ct. App. 2002).
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
U.S. Const, amend. VI. See Appellant's Addendum A.
Utah Const, art. I, § 12. See Appellant's Addendum B.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301. See Appellant's Addendum C.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-302. See Appellant's Addendum D.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Rory Curry, Defendant/Appellant, received a citation for
intoxication

on November

19, 2004, R. 1, faced arraignment

on

December 2, 2004, R. 4, and participated in a pretrial conference
on January 6, 2005. R. 10-11. He was tried and convicted on January
20, 2005, R. 14-15, and this appeal followed.
Late on the night of November 18, 2005, Officer Andrew Cox, of
the Roosevelt

City

Police

Department, responded

to a possible

burglary at the residence of a Roy Jepson. R. 40:8. When Officer
Cox

arrived

at

the

scene,

he

witnessed

Defendant

and

others

attempting to flee from Mr. Jepson' s home. R. 40:8. Officer Cox and
other peace officers repeatedly asked them to stop and Defendant
eventually did. R. 40:9.
When Officer Cox spoke with Defendant, he detected "a strong
odor of alcohol," R. 40:9, and he observed that Defendant's "speech
was very slow and slurred." R. 40:9. In addition, Defendant, who
was lying down at the time of Officer Cox's conversation with him,
R. 40:10, required assistance both to stand up and to proceed to
the police vehicle. R. 40:10.
Although no one was charged with burglary as a result of the
call, Defendant was cited for intoxication shortly after midnight
on November

19, 2005, R.

1; R. 40:10-11, because the officers

believed he posed a threat "to himself

[and] others." R. 40:11.

After all, Defendant repeatedly returned to Mr. Jepson's residence,
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though he was asked not to, and "broke a window when he was there.''
R. 40:11. Moreover, Defendant was physically impaired and he "had
no where [sic] to go [on] that [frigid] night." R. 40:11.
Just a matter of hours after his arrest, Defendant "bailed
out" of jail

(at 8:25 a.m. on November 19th). R. 40:2; R. 2-3.

"[Defendant]

was[,

however,]

on

probation

and

[his

probation

officer] . . . got [him]," R. 40:2, and took him back into custody
for

alleged

probation

violations.

R.

40:5.

Indeed,

probation

officials were able to secure "a no bail warrant." R. 40:20. (The
case for which he was on probation was "an assault by a prisoner
case." R. 40:20.)
At his arraignment in this case, Defendant pleaded not guilty,
and he opted not to change his plea at the pretrial conference. R.
40:2,5-6. It was at the pretrial hearing that Defendant, the court,
and Ms. Barton-Coombs addressed the issue of counsel. R. 40:6.
Defendant asked the court if he "c[ould] . . . talk to Ms. Coombs."
R. 40:6. The court inquired if Ms. Barton-Coombs had been retained
by Defendant in the case, R. 40:6, prompting Ms. Barton-Coombs to
ask the court if she had been "appointed." R. 40:6. The court
replied: "No, this is a Class C. I wouldn't have appointed you," R.
40:6, and then informed Defendant that if Defendant wanted Ms.
Barton-Coombs to represent him, he needed to "make arrangements to
pay her." R. 40:6. She appeared amenable. R. 40:6.
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When the trial arrived, however, Ms. Barton-Coombs did not
attend, and Defendant proceeded pro se. R. 15. Plaintiff presented
its evidence, Defendant invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to
testify, the court found Defendant guilty, and the court, with
Defendant's consent, moved on to the issue of sentencing. R. 40:19.
During the ensuing discussion, the court discovered that Defendant
had been incarcerated since November 19, 2004 on a no bail warrant
for a probation violation, R. 40:20, and that Defendant had "dried
out" while in jail. R. 40:21. The court expounded on the pitfalls
of alcoholism, encouraged Defendant to seek treatment, and then
announced Defendant's sentence. R. 40:21-22.
Defendant received a sentence of time served and six months
probation.

R.

40:22.

The

"terms

of

the

probation"

were

that

Defendant attend three Alcoholics Anonymous meetings weekly and
that he not consume alcohol. R. 40:22-23. The court then noted that
Defendant had a probation violation hearing later that day. R.
40:23.

Finally,

the

court

determined

that

"under

the

circumstances[,] [it] [would not] impose a fine." R. 40:23.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Constitution of the United States, the Utah Constitution
and Utah statutes all confer the right to counsel upon indigent
defendants in cases involving incarceration. The purpose of these
provisions is to prevent defendants from losing their liberty when
they did not benefit from the aid of an individual familiar with
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the intricacies of criminal law. A sentence of time served does not
implicate this policy, because a defendant sentenced to time served
spends no more time in jail than he or she would have if victorious
at trial. Consequently, there is no deprivation of liberty as a
result of the sentence.
In this case, Defendant completed his sentence of time served
before his trial and the six-month term of probation (unaccompanied
by any suspended sentence) , which was also a part of his sentence,
is no longer extant. While Defendant did spend a number of weeks in
jail as a result of a no bail warrant, based upon unspecified
probation violations which are not a part of the record before the
Court, Defendant spent only a matter of hours in jail for the
intoxication charge that led to his conviction, and he served all
of that time before his trial. His conviction should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
NEITHER FEDERAL NOR STATE LAW ENTITLED DEFENDANT TO
COUNSEL FOR HIS MISDEMEANOR INTOXICATION CONVICTION, WHEN
HE RECEIVED A SENTENCE OF TIME SERVED, AND THAT
CONVICTION SHOULD BE UPHELD.
"Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article 1, section 12, of the Utah Constitution guaranty an
indigent defendant the right to counsel. This right[, however,]
attaches in misdemeanor cases [only] where a deprivation of liberty
may ensue . . . ." State v. Vincent, 845 P.2d 254, 256 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992) (citation omitted) . Likewise, Utah Code Section 77-32301(1) mandates appointed counsel only when a defendant "faces the
5

substantial

probability

of

the

deprivation

of

the

indigent's

liberty," and Utah Code Section 77-32-302(1) provides for counsel
"if the indigent is under arrest for or charged with a crime in
which there is a substantial probability that the penalty to be
imposed is confinement in either jail or prison."
In assessing

the right

to counsel, therefore, this Court

applies "an after-the-fact test that requires a reviewing court to
find an uncounselled misdemeanor conviction constitutional when the
defendant was not sentenced to jail." Lavton City v. Lonqcrier, 943
P.2d 655, 658 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Similarly, under Utah statute,
a "defendant . . . [who] [i]s not sentenced to a jail term . . .
[is] not . . . entitled to appointed counsel." City of St. George
v. Smith, 828 P.2d 504, 505 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Thus, the question naturally becomes whether a sentence of
time served

amounts to a jail sentence

for constitutional

and

statutory purposes. At least two courts have found that it does
not.
In Nicholson v. State, 761 So. 2d 924, 931 (Miss. Ct. App.
2000), the defendant received a "sentence . . . [of] M 8 hrs. in
jail Time Served.'" "Upon pleading guilty," the court wrote, ". .
. Nicholson did not receive any further prison or jail time." Id.
Hence, the court concluded, "[n]o jail term was imposed." JEd. A few
years later, the tribunal once again confronted the issue, and, in
harmony with its earlier ruling, opined: "The record supports the
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conclusion that [the defendant] received no further jail time after
having pled guilty. Pretrial incarceration is of no consequence."
McLaurin v. State, 882 So. 2d 268, 272 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).
Even

more

recently,

the

Supreme

Court

of

South

Carolina

arrived at a like determination in the case of Glaze v. State,
26049

(October 17, 2005). In that case, " [the defendant] was an

indigent defendant and had neither waived his right to counsel nor
been afforded counsel by the state. He had spent ten days in jail
awaiting trial because he could not post bail." Id. Reflecting the
concern in the instant case, the Glaze Court framed the issue it
adjudicated

as

"whether

an

indigent

defendant

convicted

of a

misdemeanor is unconstitutionally denied the right to counsel if he
is sentenced to time served after neither waiving his right to
counsel nor being provided counsel by the state." Id. The court
"h[e]ld that he [wa]s not." Id.
•

In explanation,

the

jurists

averred

that

the

defendant's

theory, that a sentence of time served necessitated that he have
counsel,

"would

do

nothing

to

prevent

uncounseled

losses

of

liberty. For example," the court noted, "if [the defendant] had not
been sentenced to time served, but rather to a fine, . . . .

[a]

fine for an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction is perfectly valid
. . . . [And, the defendant] still would have spent those ten days
in jail." Id. Moreover, the court observed, "[t]he reason that [the
defendant] spent ten days in jail
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[wa]s he was charged with a

misdemeanor and could not post bail. He was subjected to no period
of confinement as a result of his uncounseled . . . conviction, so
his time-served sentence did not violate the constitution." Id.
Likewise, in the instant case, Defendant's conviction did not
result in any jail time he would not have otherwise served. What is
more, the extended period Defendant spent behind bars stemmed not
from his arrest in the instant case, but from a no bail warrant for
alleged violations of his probation in another case. R. 40:2,5,20.
Indeed, Defendant "bailed out" of jail a matter of hours after his
arrest on the incarceration charge. R. 40:2; R. 2-3. Nevertheless,
the trial court, cognizant, among other things, of Defendant's
testimony that he "dried out," R. 40:21, while incarcerated, opted
to sentence him to time served, R. 40:22, and chose, "under the
circumstances[,] . . . [not to] impose a fine." R. 40:23.
Though the trial court required no post-conviction jail time
of Defendant, Defendant nonetheless asserts that he should have
received counsel, because the "had [he] not spent . . . [the time
he did] in jail, there was a substantial probability that he would
have been incarcerated." Appellant's Br. at 7. There is no reason,
however, for the Court to engage in a hypothetical analysis. If the
trial court had imposed a sentence of incarceration,

Defendant

would have had a right to counsel, but those are not the facts
before this Court. Defendant did not receive any more time in jail
than he would have received if he had been found not guilty. As
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importantly, the facts indicate that, from the outset, it was not
the trial court's intention to imprison Defendant. After all, in
replying to Ms. Barton-Coombs inquiry as to whether she had been
appointed in the case, the court stated: "No, this is a Class C. I
wouldn't have appointed you." R. 40:6.
In

sum,

Defendant

asks

"th[is]

[C]ourt

to

reverse

his

conviction in this case [for all purposes] on the grounds that he
should have been appointed
federal

and

Appellant's

state

counsel to represent

constitutions

and

Utah

him under the

statutory

law."

Br. at 7. As noted above, however, in gauging the

constitutionality and statutory appropriateness of a conviction, it
is the sentence of incarceration, and not the conviction, in and of
itself, that is critical. Otherwise, there would be a right to
counsel in every misdemeanor case.
When an actual jail term is imposed or a suspended jail term
is

imposed,

the

convict

faces

the

certainty

or

the

solely-

conviction-based possibility of post-conviction incarceration. This
is not the situation with a sentence of time served. As noted in
Glaze, like a defendant who receives a sentence

of a fine, a

defendant sentenced to time served will not spend one more day in
jail than he or she would have if exonerated at trial.
This Court could, of course, rule that a fine is the only
sustainable sentence for an uncounseled misdemeanant. This result,
however, is unnecessary, as a sentence of time served does not, to
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any greater degree, tread upon the aim of the right to counsel,
which is to avert sentences of post-conviction incarceration when
defendants do not have the benefit of counsel.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff, Roosevelt City, requests
that

the

Court

affirm

the

trial

court's

decision,

upholding

Defendant's conviction for intoxication.
DATED this

/ {'

day of November, 2005.
ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Appellee

. McClellan
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